Electoral Uncertainty and the Volatility of International Capital Flows

I study a small open economy in which elections affect and are affected by capital inflows. Two candidates, one favoring workers and another favoring entrepreneurs, run for office; the winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. A pro labor victory results in a "sudden stop" in investment and capital flows, reflecting a time inconsistency problem. The pro business candidate is free from time inconsistency but becomes less attractive to voters if the foreign debt is larger. Hence electoral outcomes depends on the size of the debt, which itself depends on expectations about the election. The model's politico economic equilibria has several implications. Politico economic links exacerbate the responses of financial variables to exogenous shocks. Self fulfilling equilibria may exist. Policies that alleviate the pro labor candidate's commitment problem contribute to financial stability but also, and perhaps more surprisingly, to the chances of a pro labor victory in the elections. A redistribution of wealth has ambiguous although predictable effects on politico economic outcomes.

Financial crises in emerging markets: a canonical model

We present a simple model that can account for the main features of recent financial crises in emerging markets. The international illiquidity of the domestic financial system is at the center of the problem. Illiquid banks are a necessary and a sufficient condition for financial crises to occur. Domestic financial liberalization and capital flows from abroad (especially if short-term) can aggravate the illiquidity of banks and increase their vulnerability to exogenous shocks and shifts in expectations. A bank collapse multiplies the harmful effects of an initial shock, as a credit squeeze and costly liquidation of investment projects cause real output drops and collapses in asset prices. Under fixed exchange rates, a run on banks becomes a run on the currency if the central bank attempts to act as a lender of last resort.Banks and banking, Central ; International finance ; Liquidity (Economics) ; Monetary policy ; Money supply

Liquidity crises in emerging markets: Theory and policy

We build a model of financial sector illiquidity in an open economy. Illiquidity is defined as a situation in which a country's consolidated financial system has potential short-term obligations that exceed the amount of foreign currency available on short notice. We show that illiquidity is key in the generation of self-fulfilling bank and/or currency crises. We discuss the policy implications of the model and study issues associated with capital inflows and the maturity of external debt, the role of real exchange depreciation, options for financial regulation, fiscal policy, and exchange rate regimes.Financial crises ; Foreign exchange ; Capital movements ; Liquidity (Economics)

The Asian liquidity crisis

A country's financial system is internationally illiquid if its potential short-term obligations in foreign currency exceed the amount of foreign currency it can have access to in short notice. This condition may be necessary and sufficient for financial crises and/or exchange rate collapses (Chang and Velasco 1998a, b). In this paper we argue that the 1997-98 crises in Asia were in fact a consequence of international illiquidity. This follows from an analysis of empirical indicators of illiquidity as well as other macroeconomic statistics. We trace the emergence of illiquidity to financial liberalization, the shortening of the foreign debt structure, and the currency denomination of assets versus liabilities. We explain how financial crises became exchange rate collapses due to a government policy of both fixing exchange rates and acting as lender of last resort. Finally, we outline the policy implications of our view for preventing crises and for dealing with them.Banks and banking, Central ; International finance ; Liquidity (Economics) ; Monetary policy ; Money supply

Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy

We build a model of financial sector illiquidity in an open economy. Illiquidity defined as a situation in which a country's consolidated financial system has potential short-term obligations in foreign currency that exceed the amount of foreign currency it can have access to on short notice can be associated with self fulfilling bank and/or currency crises. We focus on the policy implications of the model, and study the role of capital inflows and the maturity of external debt, the way in which real exchange rate depreciation can transmit and magnify the effects of bank illiquidity, options for financial regulation, the role of debt and deficits, and the implications of adopting different exchange rate regimes.

Monetary Policy and the Currency Denomination of Debt: A Tale of Two Equilibria

Exchange rate policies depend on portfolio choices, and portfolio choices depend on anticipated exchange rate policies. This opens the door to multiple equilibria in policy regimes. We construct a model in which agents optimally choose to denominate their assets and liabilities either in domestic or in foreign currency. The monetary authority optimally chooses to float or to fix the currency, after portfolios have been chosen. We identify conditions under which both fixing and floating are equilibrium policies: if agents expect fixing and arrange their portfolios accordingly, the monetary authority validates that expectation; the same happens if agents initially expect floating. We also show that a flexible exchange rate Pareto-dominates a fixed one. It follows that social welfare would rise if the monetary authority could precommit to floating.

International contagion - implications for policy

The authors try to identify and evaluate the public policy implications of financial crises. In this model, financial contagion can be driven by a combination of fundamentals and by self-fulfilling market expectations. The model allows the authors to identify different notions of contagion, especially the distinction between"monsoonal effects","spillovers", and"switchers between equilibria". They discuss both domestic and international policy options. Domestic policies, they say, should be aimed at reducing financial fragility - that is, reducing unnecessary short-term debt commitments. With explicit commitments, the maturity of external debts should be lengthened. With implicit commitments, such as private liability guarantees, they emphasize limiting or eliminating such guarantees, to improve an economy's international liquidity and reduce its exposure to contagion. Internationally, they stress the need for improving financial standards, which makes it easier to assess when a country is subject to different kinds of contagion. The effectiveness of international rescue packages depends on the kind of contagion to which a country is exposed. Implications: the international community should help those countries that are already helping themselves.Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies

Dollarization: Analytical Issues

This paper discusses major analytical aspects of dollarization and their practical implications. We develop a simple model to stress that dollarization implies the loss of independent monetary policy and of seigniorage, yet the significance of such losses can only be evaluated in conjunction with assumptions about the policymaking process. If the government is benevolent and has no credibility problems, dollarization causes a fall in welfare, which can be measured by the implied seigniorage loss or using Mundellian optimal currency area criteria. However, outcomes are rather different if credibility is absent and dollarization can serve as a commitment device: the welfare impact of dollarization is ambiguous, and seigniorage measures and Mundellian criteria may be misleading indicators of the true cost of dollarization. We also evaluate other implications of dollarization, such as those related to last resort lending and financial stability.

Financial fragility and the exchange rate regime

We study financial fragility, exchange rate crises, and monetary policy in an open economy version of a Diamond-Dybvig model. The banking system, the exchange rate regime, and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare; if the mechanism fails, banking crises and speculative attacks become possible. We compare currency boards, fixed rates, and flexible rates with and without a lender of last resort. A currency board cannot implement a socially optimal allocation; in addition, bank runs are possible under a currency board. A fixed exchange rate system may implement the social optimum but is more prone to bank runs and exchange rate crises than a currency board. A flexible rate system implements the social optimum and eliminates runs, provided the exchange rate and central bank lending policies are appropriately designed.Banks and banking, Central ; Financial crises ; Financial institutions ; Foreign exchange rates